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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XLII DECEAMER, 1935 NuMABER 1
MAGNA CHARTA AND THE JURY SYSTEM*
JOHN H. HATcr-rF**
Becoming intrigued by the imputed connection of Magna
Charta with the jury system, I asked a recent law school graduate
if he thought a discussion of that subject would be of interest to
the legal novitiates. He was doubtful, because, as he said, the
students are more interested in the what than in the why of law.
I am fully appreciative of that attitude. However, when law or
legal procedure comes to us from the past, we can not fully appre-
ciate its present significance without understanding its origin and
development. Mr. Justice Holmes disposed of the subject in one
of his striking epigrams, saying: "Continuity with the past is not
a duty, but a necessity." Therefore, I feel justified in braving
whatever impatience you may have with the why of the jury sys-
tem, and inviting your attention to its association with Magna
Charta.
Trial by jury is now said to be guaranteed by the constitu-
tional provision, (common to all the states,) that no man shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without the judgment of his
peers. The phrase "the judgment of his peers" is a literal trans-
lation of the Latin words "judicium parium suorum" occurring
in Magna Charta. For this reason the Supreme Court of the
United States, accredited the jury system to Magna Charta, say-
ing: "When Magna Charta declared that no freeman should be
deprived of life, etc. 'but by the judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land' it referred to a trial by twelve jurors. "' Fourteen
"An address delivered before the Student Body of the College of Law, West
Virginia University, May 15, 1935.
""Member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Charleston, W. Va.
I Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349, 18 S. Ct. 620 (1897).
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2 MAGNA CHARTA AND THE JURY SYSTEM
years before that opiniQn the same court, in Hurtado v. California,
stated: "The words nisi per legale judicium parium (Magna
Charta) had no reference to a jury."2  As the two statements are
diametrically opposite, it would therefore seem "Quandoque bonus
dormitat Homerus. "3
Other courts and authorities from Coke down have also nodded
in regard to the connection of Magna Charta with the jury sys-
tem. The early authorities generally support Thompson 'v. Utah.4
The later writers generally support Hurtado v. California and
scoff at the so-called guaranty of trial by jury in the Charter as
a "most persistent fallacy," "an unpardonable anachronism,"
etc. In their great work on English law Pollock and Maitland
say: "In after days it was possible to worship the words 'nisi per
legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae' because it
was possible to misunderstand them. "5 Such division of authority
points our attention at once to the historical setting of Magna
Charta.
That instrument was executed by King John of England in
the year 1215. The deep darkness of the Middle Ages was break-
ing then, but the dawn was not at all luminous. Much of the
history of those times is indefinite and much is tinctured by tradi-
tion. Hence, in commenting on that period, some generalization
is unavoidable. John was one of the so-called Norman Kings,
being a great-grandson of William the Conqueror. At that time
the feudal system was in flower. The King was then what Louis
XIV. of France later termed himself - "the State." All the land
in England was, in theory, held under the King. He apportioned
it among the greater lords who were responsible to him for a cer-
tain number of fighting men. Those lords sublet portions of their
land to tenants of greater or less degree, who rendered military
service in part payment of their fiefs. The sub-tenants were free-
men, and were usually knights or classed as such. They consti-
2 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 529, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1883).
3 Sometimes even good Homer himself nods.
4 See 1 Co. INST. (1809) 45; 3 B. COMT Af. (1768) c. 23; CRABB, HISTORY
op ENGLISH LAW (1829) 134; HARE, AMIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1889)
863-4. 16 R. C. L. § 3; 35 C. J. § 12.
r1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISn LAW (2d ed. 1898) 173.
Accord: HYATT ON TRIALS § MCKECINIE, MAGNA CARTA (1905) 158,
451; LESSER, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEMI (1894) 163-4;
REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (Finlason ed. 1869) 42-3;' 1 HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1922) 59; MAcCLACIILAN, ENGLISH
CYCLOPEDIA 111, article on Jury; FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852)
91-2; 17 ENc. BRIT. (l1th ed. 1910) 317; HANNIS TAYr.OR, AmERICAN
CONSTITUTION 75-6, 363, 366.
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tuted the main fighting force of the realm. They did no work.
That was done by the underclasses, chief among which were the
villeins, composing five-sixths of the population of England.6
Every baron of consequence had a castle from which he was prac-
tically "lord of all he surveyed," until his survey was inter-
rupted by some greater lord or the King.
There were no professional lawyers then, what knowledge
there was of law being possessed by a few churchmen. The prim-
itive state of the law is demonstrated by the legal procedure.
Strange to say, in view of the declaration of the Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Utah, that procedure bears no likeness to the
modern jury trial. The usual - perhaps the only - modes of
trial were by witnesses, compurgation, ordeal and combat. In
trial by witnesses the litigation was decided by all the people in
the neighborhood who knew anything about the dispute either
personally or from neighborhood talk. In trial by compurgation
the decision went to the litigant who could produce the greater
weight of oaths. The weight of an oath depended upon the wer-
gild of the witness. Wergild was the value set. by law upon a
man's life. In case of murder, the murderer's family paid to the
family of the dead man a certain sum of money in settlement of
the crime. That sum was wergild. The plan was not without
merit. The dead man's family was compensated. The expense
and hysteria of trial were eliminated. No fuss - no feathers.
Wergild varied according to a man's station in life. For ex-
ample, the wergild of an ordinary churl or freeman wa s two
hundred shillings. So the oath of a knight whose wergild was
one thousand shillings was equal to that of five churls. It is
naively recorded, however, that the oath of any English churl was
considered as weighty as that of two Welshmen.7  In trial by
ordeal, the ordinary person was submitted to a shocking test such
as contact with boiling water or red-hot iron. An ordeal was sup-
posed to be under Divine supervision, and preparation for it was
made by fasting and prayer. If the accused was innocent, it was
thought that God would preserve him through the ordeal. Since
the ordeal was conducted by churchmen, they imposed on an ac-
cused of their own number a very mild test, called "the ordeal
of the accursed morsel." "This," says Lesser, "consisted in mak-
ing the accused person swallow a piece of bread placed on the
0 CROSS, HISTORY OF ENOLAND (1914) 94.
7 Shades of Lloyd George!
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4 MAGNA CHARTA AND THE JURY SYSTEM
altar with great ceremony .... and accompanied with a prayer
that it might choke him if he was guilty." 8
In trial by personal combat judgment went for the victor.
This mode of trial was introduced in England by the Normans,
was highly favored by the barons, who were men of war, and was
used to settle practically all manner of legal disputes. It does
seem strange that the Englishmen of that period had not the abil-
ity to develop an efficient mode of trial. We are gazing backward,
however, from the vantage of inherited information. The heir
should not regard his lineage with disdain. All prior ages have
been ignorant of matters which are now quite commonplace. A
striking illustration of this statement is furnished by the Central
American civilizations which flourished at or near the date of
Magna Charta. The Mayas, the Taltees and Aztecs attained high
levels of culture, and possessed great proficiency in architecture,
stone carving, pottery and the textile arts. Yet, they were com-
pletely ignorant of iron, of the principle of the wheel and of the
true arch.10 The Englishmen of 1215 made common use of iron,
the wheel and the arch, but they had no conception of determining
a law suit solely on its merits.
The protection of the law at best was poor enough then; but
without resorting to any legal process, King John had been pro-
ceeding with force of arms against such barons as he pleased for
purposes of pillage and oppression. Consequently, a majority of
the barons banded together for their own preservation, cornered
John at Runnymede and forced him to stipulate that he would
proceed against them no more except upon the judgment of their
peers or by the law of the land. Runnymede is pictured by an
old chronicler as "a pleasant meadow by the Thames, where rushes
grow in the clear water of the winding river and its banks are
green with grass and trees."" John's capitulation there was
written in Latin and was entitled Magna Charta (Great Charter).
In a burst of enthusiasm over the Charter, the great historian
Green says: "The rights which the barons claimed for themselves,
they claimed for the nation at large."' 2  That quotation was se-
lected because the assertion it makes is the thread suspending the
jury system from Magna Charta. At that period, generally speak-
s LESSER, Op. cit. supra n. 5, 82. There is more than a hint in the old rec-
ords that the ordeals were frequently faked in favor of those having influence.
9 LESSER, op. cit. supra n. 5, 91.
10 5 ENO. BRIT. (14th ed. 1929) 130.
" A charming gray-green color still bears the name Runnymeoe Green.
12 1 GREEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (1905) 255.
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ing, the sovereign oppressed the barons, and they in turn oppressed
the common people. In an age of barbarous practices, the barons
were notoriously rapacious. The chronicles of, that time indicate
no uprising of the people against the barons or the King. The
people were prostrate. Only the barons themselves were in revolt.
The people had no representation in the preparation of Magna
Charta. The liberties of the insurgent barons and even the lives
of their leaders were at stake. For them, under such stress volun-
tarily to have exacted concessions in favor of the common people,
whom they contemptuously regarded as legitimate prey, would
have exhibited a humanity having no support whatsoever in feudal
history. It is true that the Charter uses the phrase "iber lhomo"
meaning freeman, as the one whose rights were thereby assured.
The dictionaries agree, however, that the word freeman "has had
various meanings at different stages of history," and that "in old
English law, the word described a freeholder or tenant by free
services; one who was not a villein. "'" The annals further dis-
close that only the dukes, earls, barons, knights and others who
held knights' fees were classed as freeholders at the time of the
Charter. "The general body of freeholders were all pares (peers)
.... Indeed apart from that privilege of peerage, which applied
as against the crown, every freeholder was a baron, and in early
times was so called.""- The Encyclopaedia Britannica, after crit-
icizing the foregoing assertion of Green, says: "The villeins, who
formed the majority of the population, got very little from it
(Magna Charta) ; in fact the only clauses which protect them do
so because they are property - the property of their lords -
and therefore valuable. They get neither political nor civil rights
under Magna Charta."'' s It therefore appears that Mr. Green was
wrong; that Magna Charta was designed to protect the baronial
class alone, and that any protection afforded the common people
was incidental.
The Latin word par means an equal, and the ordinary trans-
lation of the phrase judicium parium would be the judgment of
equals. Judiciumn parium, being a legal term, has a special or
idiomatic meaning at law, just as many other legal phrases have.
Take, for instance, the expression "he puts himself upon the
13BLAcx's LAW DIcTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
12 RELrES, op. cit. supra n. 5, 42(n), 64. Accord: PROFFATT, TRIAL BY JURY
(1877) § 24; MCKEC NIE, op. cit. mspra n. 5, 435-439.
1517 ENC. BRiT. (11th ed. 1910). Accord: HYATTi and REEVES, op. cit.
supra M. 5.
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6 MAGNA CHARTA AND THE JURY SYSTEM
country." That expression is unintelligible to anyone not familiar
with its idiomatic significance. At law it means that he submitted
his case to a jury. The expression arose from the fact that origin-
ally the jury was impaneled exclusively from knights who re-
sided in the country. Judicium parium is commonly construed
now to refer to the verdict of a jury. But at the time of Magna
Charta, judicium parium had a different meaning which was
thoroughly understood throughout England and feudal Europe.
That term then applied solely to the judgment of a feudal court.
Every baronial proprietor of importance, attended by his knights
(pares) had his court. The knights who were acquainted with
facts relating to the litigation applied the law of the fief thereto,
and pronounced the judgment. 6 That judgment was the judicium
parium of Magna Charta - a judgment of equals, it is true, but
the equals were always knights.17  At no time in the history of
English jurisprudence has a jury ever rendered a judgment. And
for a legal instrument such as Magna Charta to term the verdict
of a jury a judicium (judgment) - the word used in the Charter
- "would have been as gross a blunder in 1215 (the date of the
Charter) as it would be at the present time.' '" 8  A vestige of
judicium parium in its original significance still lingers in England
in the right of a peer to be tried by the House of Lords on a charge
of treason or felony.lsa
Hare, Crabb and other nodding authorities would strengthen
their position through the words in Magna Charta "per legem
terrac" (by the law of the land). They claim the words referred
to the common law system, which comprehends trial by jury. They
apparently believed the story that the common law came from that
mystical period when the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary. Evidently they had the conception, entertained by some,
that the common law was so named because it was the law of the
common people, and that the nucleus of the common law was
formed sometime during the Dark Ages and of its own force grew,
and grew, and grew, until it dominated the entire realm. Their
conception is legendary, just as legendary, in fact, as the myth
le6,Tenks, The Deveopment of Teutonic Law (1907) 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AmFICAN LEGAL HISTORY 44.
17 LESSER, Op. cit. supra n. 5, 166, 167; 1 POLLOCK & MAiTLAND, Op. Cit. supra
n. 5, 43; McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta (1914). 14 CoL. L.
REv. 27, 43; PnorrATT, TRIAL BY JuRY.
is 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 173.
18a Note, for example, the recent trial of Lord do Clifford by the House of
Lords, a fortnight or so ago, when the defendant sought a trial by his peers
on a charge of manslaughter.
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that William Tell shot the apple off the head of his red-cheeked
boy, or that George Washington chopped the cherry tree and re-
fused to fib about it.
While I harry that conception, your thought should travel
slowly - very slowly. It should travel not by days, years or gen-
erations, but by centuries. The following narration of events
will require but a few minutes. An equal number of centuries
was required for the progression of those events. The common
law did not spring from and did not derive its name from the
common people; and there was no system of law common to all
of England when that country emerged from the Dark Ages (and
commenced to have a national memory)." The laws were then
tribal instead of territorial.2  In fact, every fief had its own cus-
toms and usages which were respected as laws in the local courts.
There was no court with general jurisdiction over the local courts.
There was in fact no unifying juridical agency until the subsequent
ascendancy of the King's Court (of which more later) under the
Norman Kings.21 The jurisdiction of that court though very
limited at first did extend over the entire kingdom. Such exten-
sive jurisdiction made that court the only legal institution ever in
position to unify nationally the variant laws of the fiefs. That
court after a long period of time did finally weld the local laws into
a fairly uniform system. That system was common to all of Eng-
land and for that reason became entitled thte common law of Eng-
land. Professor Jenks says the common law is "the law of the
royal court ..... It is judiciary law; the men who declared it were
judges, not legislators, nor wise men of the shires." 2  "The cus-
tom of the King's court is the custom of England and becomes the
common law," say Pollock and Maitland. That result was not
accomplished until long after the date of the Charter.23 The lex
terrae referred to in Magna Charta was the law of the fiefs in con-
tradistinction to the arbitrary will of the King. That law as
against his will was the real issue between the barons and John.
24
Lex terrae naturally embraced trial by witnesses, compurga-
tion, ordeal and battle. Some writers take the position that only
19 Zane, The FVe Ages of the Bench and Bar of England (1907) 1 SELECT
EssAYs IN ANGLO-AMERcAN LEGAL HIsTOrY 625.
20 Maitland, Materials for the History of English Law (1907) 2 SELECT
EssAys IN ANGLo-AmmeCAN LAw 66-67.
21 Zane, op. cit. supra n. 19, 647-8.
22 Jenks, op. cit. supra n. 16, 50-3.
23 1 PoLLOCK & MAITLANiD, 176 and 184-5.
24 Meflwain, op. cit. supra n. 17.
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those four modes of trial were comprehended in the phrase of the
Charter, per legem terrae.25 That position does not seem tenable.
Certain sections of the Charter contain specifications relating to
the assizes of the King's court (established by Henry II, John's
father), which at that time tried certain questions affecting real
property."8  By those specifications the barons recognized27 trial
by the assize as lex terrae, along with judicium parium. The as-
size deserves consideration because later it played some part in
the formation of the jury system. "Assisa vertitur in juratam."
(The assize is converted into a jury.) 28  The inain differences be-
tween the judiciurn parium of the feudal courts, and the verdict of
the assize in the King's court were in names and formalities. For,
mind you, the assize consisted originally of a body of knights "girt
with swords" selected by four other knights - all of whom were
fellow barons (pares) and the assize decided the case not as a jury,
but upon the personal knowledge of its own members.20  The
judiciaries of the King's court were usually ecclesiastics, and were
regarded by the barons as inferiors. So there is no thought that
the judiciaries then overawed the assize as they later did the jury.
The assize was essentially a baronial tribunal though acting under
warrant of the King, and in certain, if not all, litigations affecting
real estate, the defendant could elect between trial by assize and
trial by combat." In passing, it is interesting to note the tenacity
with which trial by combat adhered to English law. "Wager of
battel" as a mode of trial was recognized by a high court of Eng-
land as late as 1818, as still "the law of the land.""' (That mode
of trial was abolished at the succeeding session of Parliament in
1819.)
The jury system is not even the offspring of popular assem-
blies, but is an emanation of royal power. Modern investigation
has proved that the system is mainly the outgrowth of a Frankish
inquisition or inquiry, which was the prerogative right of the
Frankish rulers. That prerogative was introduced into England
in 1066 by William the Conqueror, whose Duchy of Normandy
25 See Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury (1924) 58 Am. L. REv. 24.
261dagna Carta §§ 17, 18 and 19; §§ 11, 12 and 13 of Coke's arrangement.
Coke's Second Institute follows the fourth edition (1225 ed.) of Magna Carta
as set forth in I Stat.- at L. 6, 7. Coke was apparently not familiar with
the original or earlier editions of the Great Charter.
27 "Enshrine", say 1 PoLLoCK & MAimmD, at 146.
28 H OwSWORTH, op. cit. surra n. 5, 151.
29 LESSER, op. cit. supra n. 5, e. 9.
-o I POLLocK & MAXAITqLA 148.
3' See Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & A. 405, 460 106 Eng. Rep. R. 149 (1818).
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was a part of the Frankish Empire.-2 The royal prerogative con-
sisted simply in the right of the King to have determined, by a
body of his own appointees, any fact in connection with the pub-
lic administration. That proceeding was not a trial in any sense,
but merely an investigation. It was similar to that of an investi-
gating committee appointed by our Legislature or Congress. When
first introduced in England, the inquisitorial body was not com-
posed of any definite number of men. Twelve was not even a pre-
ferred number until long after the date of the Charter." As the
burden of government increased, the Kings were unable to handle
personally the details of necessary governmental investigations.
So they would send trusted representatives throughout the king-
dom to have the investigations conducted. A most notable ex-
ercise of that prerogative occurred in the reign of William the
Conqueror. He had a genius for government as well as for mili-
tary enterprise. In order to learn the resources of his kingdom,
he had commissions impaneled in every hundred throughout Eng-
land. A hundred was a territorial division of old England, so-
called because the division comprised a hundred hides. A hide
was enough land to support a family and in William's time was
normally reckoned at 120 acres. A mark of his statesmanship ap-
pears in his requirement that one-half of the members of each
commission be native Englishmen and the other half Normans,
thus insuring fairness to each class. Those commissions obtained
the information from which "the great fiscal record known as
Domesday Book was compiled." The Domesday book ("Dooms-
day Book") contains a list of :England's landed proprietors with
a description of their properties, liabilities, etc. The book is com-
parable generally to one of our modern land books and is said
to have been given its name because William made it a book of
final authority, - as final, it was said, as the Day of Doom. A
succession of steps led the Crown to appoint those who were
learned in the law as its representatives to procure those investiga-
tions, then to make their appointments permanent, and then to
arrange for them stated times and fixed places of visitation
throughout all the kingdom. By those steps was formed a most
important extension of curia legis - "the King's Court." There,
we find for the first time in the history of English jurisprudence
32 The inquisition here referred to is not to be confused with the Spanish
Inquisition. That was a religious proceeding; this was political.
33 THAYER, DEVEIOPomENT OF TRiAL BY JuRY (1896) 85.
9
Hatcher: Magna Charta and the Jury System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935
10 MAGNA CHARTA AND THE JURY SYSTEM
a professional lawyer guiding the investigations of a fact-finding
body. There, is the foundation of our modern common law court.
Legal procedure progressed slowly during the period roughly
estimated at three hundred years following the establishment of
the King's court. But at the end of that period, trials by ordeal
and by the witnesses themselves had been abolished; the indefinite
number comprising the inquisition had been stabilized in a jurata
of twelve; and the jurata (or jury) was trying a case - in theory
- upon the evidence.
The inquisition was first used exclusively to facilitate the
King's business. Its use to settle private litigations was later per-
mitted by the King "as a royal boon" to certain preferred sub-
jects who besought it. In suits wherein the Crown had no interest
the justice of the King's court - first with its inquisition, and
then with both inquisition and assize, and finally with the jurata
- was found to be preferable to that of the manorial courts.
Therefore, the popularity of the King's court increased and its
jurisdiction was extended upon the petition of the parties "bit
by bit, now for this class of cases and now for that," until in the
course of time that jurisdiction over all law cases was volun-
tarily conceded. 34 It was wholly through consent of the litigants
to be tried in the King's court by its fact-finding body and not
through Magna Charta that trial by jury became established.
And to this very day the formal expression of that consent, though
now unnecessary, persists in the conventional phrase of our com-
mon law orders, "The plaintiff puts himself upon the country and
the defendant doth the like."
The judges of the King's court were appointed by the King
and were removable at his pleasure. The natural result was that
for centuries royal partisans were appointed judges, and that they
executed the royal will as far as possible. The records show that
the jurata was not constituted until about 1485; and for the next
two hundred years it was so completely dominated by the judges
that only a few instances occurred of verdicts contrary to judicial
pleasure. In those instances, the refractory jurors were either
imprisoned or fined heavily, or both.35 You who have read
Sabatini's masterful description of the arbitrary tactics of Lord
Chief Justice Jeffreys in the fictitious trial of Peter Blood, have
doubtless wondered if the novelist did not indulge his imagination
34 1 PoLoOCK & MAiTLAN 93, 140, 141, 144, 149, 153.
35 PR0PoTT, TRIAL By JuRY §§ 35-38.
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1935], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss1/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
to some extent. I find that Sabatini's fiction is supported in every
particular by the official record of the trial of Lady Alice Lisle
in 1685.36  She was convicted of high treason for having enter-
tained, unwittingly, a Presbyterian minister who had taken part in
the rebellion against James II. The King was set on her execu-
tion, and agreed with his Chief Justice before the trial, not to
pardon her. Jeffreys presided. Besides giving hearsay testimony
himself, Jeffreys continuously harangued and berated both wit-
nesses and jury against Mrs. Lisle, 7 using the blasphemous lang-
uage of a madman. The record shows that before the jury re-
turned its verdict of guilty, the foreman had three times in open
court expressed dissatisfaction with the evidence against her, and
each time had been contemptuously reprinanded by Jeffreys. The
public prints of that period go further -- they say that the jury
found her not guilty three times, and then because of terror at
the mounting fury of Jeffreys and his threats to attaint the jury
of treason, it changed the verdict. The per legem terrae of Magna
Charta, says Proffat, '"afforded but a slight shield to the innocent
at that time, when the royal will or wish was at all hazards and
without opposition carried into effect." The early English writ-
ers who attributed the jury system to Magna Charta should have
known of the initial and long continued domination of juries by
judges. Those writers were extremely inadvertent when they
would have the insurgent barons at Runnymede perpetuating a
tribunal, which, had it really existed, would have been dominated
through partisan judges by a King whom the barons feared and
detested. The barons may have been dumb, but not so dumb.
Five centuries passed after Magna Charta before the jury
system was finally perfected. The bare foundation of the system
may be traced to King Henry II and his justiciars. The develop-
ment of the system is due to no one man or set of men, but to the
general development of English civilization. Magna Charta did
set the law (theoretically) above the Crown, and for that reason
is "a fundamental statute." 38 For that reason, also, it merits the
veneration of Englishmen as "a sacred text" and as "the pal-
ladium of English liberty." But Magna Charta had no formative
part in either the foundation or the perfection of the jury system.
30 11 How. St. Tr. 297 (1811).
37 From the report of the case in Howell's State Trials it would appear that
the defendant should more properly be addressed as Mrs. Lisle rather than
as Lady Alice Lisle .
38 1 POLLOCK & MMAND 173.
11
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Why then was it so held, you ask? Judge Clark said: "The
identification of judicium parium with trial by jury evidently
owed its origin to a not unnatural tendency of a later generation
of lawyers to explain what was unfamiliar in the great charter by
the surroundings of their own day." I would amplify that ex-
planation. The English people have always been obsessed'with
admiration for the ancient institutions of England. Even the
barons in 1215 were clamoring for "the good laws" of Edward
the Confessor, who lived two hundred years before. Coke and
Blackstone exhausted language in lauding the customs and usages
of a by-gone age. After the jury was finally rid of judicial dom-
ination, it became so highly appreciated by the English nation
that the people were not content to attribute it to procedural evolu-
tion. An antecedent must be found worthy of the exalted position
it had acquired. It must have been confirmed by the Crown.
So, yielding to the national obsession, the English judges gave an
unnatural construction to the words in Magna Charta, in order
to have that venerable instrument generate the jury system.
Whether or not my amplification is correct, it may be said with
assurance that some popular reason was the cause of this miscon-
struction, a misconstruction so flagrant that it has been termed
"the great distortion of history.' '9
The misconstruction of judicium parium illustrates most
forcibly the habit of courts, on occasion, to discard the literal
meaning of a constitutional provision. Dictionary and idiom are
ignored. Judicial perception finds in the provision, though hither-
to unsuspected, what the popular needs require. For that reason
Finley Peter Dunne, a leading American humorist thirty years
ago, had his "Mr. Dooley" say, in fun, that the Supreme Court
of the United States followed the election returns. There is much
philosophy in that satire. The Constitution is but an expression
of the will of the people. The election returns likewise express the
will of the people and carry a later message than the Constitution.
Therefore, in so far as election returns clearly reflect the popular
will upon a constitutional matter, I see no reason why they should
not receive judieidl consideration. My attitude on this subject
has been called radical. The accusation is not particularly dis-
tasteful, but I am advocating nothing novel. My views are pat-
terned merely on what representative courts have consistently
done. I observe nothing more than was observed by that great
39 1 Po,ocx & MArmL 594.
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commentator, Viscount Bryce, in his work on Constitutions: "But
experience has shown that where public opinion sets strongly in
favour of the line of conduct which the Legislature has followed
in stretching the Constitution, the Courts are themselves affected
by that opinion, and go as far as their legal conscience and the
general sense of the legal profession permit - possibly sometimes
even a little farther - in holding valid what the Legislature has
done.' '4 That judicial attitude has been the despair of teachers
of constitutional law. Professor Gray gave up the attempt, saying
constitutional law "was not law at all, but politics." If Profes-
sor Gray used the word "politics" in its uncorrupted sense, mean-
ing the science of civil government, I agree with him.
There can be no fixed construction of a constitutional pro-
vision, general in its terms. John Marshall himself said that such
a provision must be adapted "to the various crises in human af-
fairs."I' One hundred years later, the pronouncement of Marshall
is paralleled by the formula of Brandeis: "The logic of words
should yield to the logic of realities." Such adaptations and such
capitulations are essentially matters of statecraft, rather than law.
Professor Frankfurter grasped the situation when he wrote: "The
Supreme Court has long ceased to be merely a legal tribunal;
today it passes upon great social and economic issues." The Con-
stitution exists to protect the people - not to repress them.
When, through financial or social changes, the letter of the Con-
stitution chafes the people, the Constitution fails its purpose, un-
less the courts through liberal construction relieve the attrition.
A statesmanlike editor warns: "Government should not be so in-
flexible that it makes man a victim of the machinery he has set
up for his own protection."142  In fact, 4o government under a
written constitution can endure, if the courts regard it as a na-
tional strait-jacket. The constitutional garment must be stretched
by the courts to fit growth unforeseen when the garment was fash-
ioned; else it will be scorned as outmoded or it will be rent by
revolution. And if this be heresy, it was fostered by that amazing
fabrication of the courts - the kinship of Magna Charta and the
jury system.
40BRhYCE, THE AmXERICAN CoNsTITUTIoL, 197.
41 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 415, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
42 Huntington Advertiser, Jan. 18, 1934, editorial.
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